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ARMY MEDICAL SUPPORT IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: OPPORTUNITY FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
The choice is about meeting, or not meeting, the challenges of a changed and changing world. The consequences of failure are simply too great.
MHS 2025 -Toward a New Enterprise
The subject of civilian and military working relationships in peace operations and humanitarian relief missions has been a significant topic of interest, debate, and consternation of late. Since the end of the Cold-War, the international community has been responding to a resounding number of conflicts that target civilians and result in humanitarian disasters and human rights violations. In virtually all of these conflicts, the response and intervention has involved components of the military, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), making it necessary for dialogue among all parties. 1 The ability of these diverse players to communicate and work well together in the spirit of cooperation is a key factor to the success of any peace operation or humanitarian assistance mission.
The United Nations is the most recognized IGO and the principal actor in peace operations. Since 1948, the UN has authorized fifty-five peacekeeping missions in over twentyfive locations around the world and as of this writing, fifteen operations are concurrently being conducted.
2 Since the end of the Cold-War, the United States military has frequently been called upon by the President to participate in these military operations other than war (MOOTW). In the past decade, new military doctrine that describes MOOTW and methods for planning and executing these missions has emerged, based on the realization that these operations are not about to disappear. Included in the new doctrine is the subject of military involvement in humanitarian assistance (HA) operations and the importance of HA to the success of any peace operation. According to FM 100-23-1, "HA is an important MOOTW that the US military is uniquely qualified to plan and execute. Unlike any other single organization, the military has the organizational structure, educated and trained personnel, essential equipment, rapid worldwide deployability, and ability to operate in austere physical environments." 3 Many civilian humanitarian assistance agencies might take exception to such a claim by the US military, but nonetheless, both military and civilian personnel will find themselves on the same stage, operating to relieve suffering and restore peace. And perhaps it is these relief missions that most critically require extensive communication and cooperation between civilian and military parties; missions in which human life is at stake, and future survival may be at risk.
The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) is a key player in these missions and in virtually any of these military areas of operation (AO), a humanitarian NGO is or eventually will be present. Some coordination and communication between these parties is inevitable. This paper will briefly examine civil-military relations in OOTW, the role of AMEDD in OOTW and finally illustrate AMEDD's potential for setting the standard in civil-military cooperation.
BACKGROUND
The Army has assisted in disaster relief since just after the Civil War, when commanders were often called upon to respond to tornadoes, earthquakes, floods and disease. The art of medicine was still primitive at this time so it wasn't until the early 20 th century, that Army medical assets became the nation's primary source of medical and public health aid in domestic disasters. 4 Following WWI, the Army found itself at odds with Congress over relief aid funding and in dispute with the Red Cross over authority in disaster operations. As a result, AMEDD participation in disaster relief declined significantly. After WWII, the creation of federal, state and private sector relief agencies further deterred AMEDD participation in disaster relief and AMEDD assistance was limited to instances only when these civilian agencies became overwhelmed. But after WWII, the United States began participating in disaster assistance overseas and although much of the coordination was orchestrated by these same civilian relief agencies, Army medical personnel were frequently called upon to render assistance. 5 It was during these times that perhaps the stage was being set for the establishment of civil-military relationships that would require solid coordination and cooperation in order to achieve the maximum benefit for those requiring assistance.
The Army involvement in foreign disaster assistance has obviously evolved since the end of WWII. The world has changed and as such, the strategic security environment has changed requiring the Army to respond to new and unique threats to our national security. To accommodate these changes, Army doctrine has been rewritten to address such responses that have come to be referred to as operations other than war (OOTW). Should the Army treat a condition that is untreatable by the host nation? What is the best way to transfer care back to the community? And is it appropriate to provide a level of care that cannot be sustained once the Army departs? 17 Perhaps one of the most important and useful factors to consider in humanitarian assistance missions is the capabilities of the humanitarian NGOs that are present in the region. 18 The aforementioned factors and dilemmas facing AMEDD in HA are seemingly the same issues that humanitarian NGOs must grapple with and should be discussed and resolved to some degree by effective communication and coordination between AMEDD and the NGO personnel.
The Civil-Military Operations Center or CMOC provides the venue for just such communication and coordination. As Andre Natsios states, "The most practical mechanism for ensuring that some coherent strategic design and planning does take place is the system of civil military operations centers (CMOC), developed to establish and maintain operational contact among the military and humanitarian participants in a complex operations." 19 The CMOC is established to encourage sharing of information and coordination of resources in order to avoid duplication of efforts. This can be of particular importance to military and civilian health care providers in resolving the aforementioned dilemmas regarding the provision of health care to a host nation populace. But is this coordination taking place?
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS
According to The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the mission of a CMOC is to coordinate the military and civilian aspects of a humanitarian assistance effort by providing the linkage between the military commander and other governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)." 20 A CMOC does not necessarily need to be a building or any type of physical structure. In fact, Chris Seiple suggests that a CMOC might simply be a process that occurs, perhaps in the form of a professional relationship or informal, meaningful, and productive communication, where the result is a cooperative effort.
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The first true case study of civil-military relationships and the concept of a CMOC come out of Northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). After the Gulf War, hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled from northern Iraq to the mountains of southeastern Turkey. But despite distribution of food and the provision of emergency aid, the sanitary conditions of the camps and the overall humanitarian situation rapidly deteriorated. When Turkey requested assistance, the US responded with 12,000 troops (other allied forces responded as well) with a threefold mission to 1) alleviate suffering in the mountain camps, 2) repatriate the refugees from the mountains to a camp in northern Iraq more conducive to providing assistance, and 3) finally return the refugees to their original villages. The overall goal of the operation was to successfully achieve the aforementioned missions and then conduct a transfer of humanitarian efforts over to the NGOs. 22 During OPC, these two groups of people, soldiers and NGO civilians who had no experience with each another were forced to come together and collaborate in this extremely complex humanitarian emergency. According to numerous accounts, much of the success of this operation can be best attributed to the continuous communication and cooperation among the military and civilian agencies.
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This spirit of cooperation and desire to work cooperatively in these emergency situations is not, however, a natural phenomenon between military personnel and NGOs. There are people of the opinion in both camps that humanitarian issues are the responsibility of the humanitarian community, and not the military. Andrew Natsios writes that even after responding to five complex humanitarian emergencies there are those in the rank and file that remain uncomfortable participating in these missions. He goes on to imply that many in uniform are unsure why they are given duties that they have not even been trained to perform. 24 In keeping with good order and discipline, no one in uniform will publicly denounce the participation in HA, but it is understood that there are varying opinions. Another concern regarding any relationship with the military during HA is the issue of neutrality. Many humanitarian NGOs adhere to a doctrine of neutrality and fear that any relationship or appearance of cooperation with the military will compromise their neutrality.
According to Lindenburg and Bryant, the work of NGOs should be based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. 32 Discussion of these principles has been cause for debate within the NGO community, but none dispute that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the most successful in maintaining true neutrality while responding to complex humanitarian emergencies. Many NGOs make the claim that the ability of an organization to demonstrate impartiality is tied to their financial and political independence. But according to Natsios, neutrality is admirable, but not a necessary condition of humanitarian operations. In fact, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain neutrality in many of today's complex humanitarian emergencies. 33 Some NGOs now prescribe to this thinking and advocate taking "sides" in these conflicts. "They believe that one group in a conflict has a more just cause than the other." We had many NGOs tour our hospital and the general reaction was amazement that we were actually caring, smart people trying to do a good job. We cared for hundreds of Afghans, mostly mine victims, and many, many of them were children. We saw thousands in our MEDCAPS. The NGOs generally then expressed interest in working with us, but none of those projects came to fruition.
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Generally, the military sees NGOs as unorganized, unprepared and undisciplined while NGOs see the military as rigid, controlling warriors that have no concern for the civilian populations being affected by their actions.
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Ironically these two groups, regardless of how they perceive each other, actually need each other. The military comes fully manned and equipped to respond to any complex humanitarian emergency and NGOs often request support from the military. As Steve
Henthorne has said, "The military has assets that most NGOs can only dream about!" 39 When
NGOs comprehend the tremendous capabilities of the US military, with its unique warfighting and humanitarian abilities, they become more receptive to increased interagency operations.
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Likewise, NGOs typically have a long standing presence and relationship with the local community and they enjoy a strong inter-NGO connection that allows for quick affiliation with indigenous agencies and the sharing of a wealth of information and expertise. In a nutshell, NGOs are innovative and dedicated; the military is well equipped and organized.
STEPS TOWARD IMPROVED UNITY OF EFFORTS
In May of 1994 after an extensive inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs, then-President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 that addressed six major issues of reform and improvement. This PDD followed peace operations in Somalia, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti during which funding, command and control, protection of peacekeepers and overall support were questionable and often chaotic.
PDD 25 provided a comprehensive policy framework for OOTW by addressing such items as the requirement for rigorous standards of review prior to US involvement in these operations, and International Medical Corps (IMC). For example, the mission of IMC is "to improve the quality of life through health interventions and related activities that build local capacity." 51 The MSF mission is "to deliver emergency medical relief to populations threatened by armed conflict, civil strife, epidemics, or natural and man-made disasters." 52 PIH simply aims to "tackle health crises that can't be solved and does whatever it takes to solve them." 53 All four of these organizations have an ultimate goal of providing the tools and resources necessary to assist the host nation in developing a viable and sustainable health care infrastructure. Perhaps for these reasons, it has been observed during humanitarian assistance operations that military medical personnel are able to maintain a professional rapport with NGOs while the NGOs reject other military players.
But in spite of these similarities, shared visions, and perceived cooperation, history has shown that the medical community during humanitarian assistance operations has experienced some difficult challenges. For example, during Operation Provide Comfort humanitarian NGOs were arriving at numerous entry points of a Kurdish refugee camp and setting up their operation without any prior coordination with UNHCR or the military task force. In the meantime, the Army medical assets were receiving orders from various sources; therefore initial efforts to assist the refugees were not appropriately directed toward rehydration, starvation and sanitation which were the immediate medical threats in the mountain camps. Perhaps with dialogue, coordination and planning in the CMOC at Zakho between the Army medical personnel and the NGOs, this situation could have been quickly and easily resolved. As one after action report states, "doctrine and training relative to the interface between civilian volunteer medical organizations and US military medical personnel need to be developed and implemented. The lack of interface was a perpetual source of control problems that adversely affected treatment coverage and optimal use of available medical assets."
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Army medical assistance in a humanitarian operation is governed by US and international law as well as medical rules of engagement (ROEs). These laws and rules dictate and define the scope of medical care that can be delivered by US medical forces operating in any deployed environment but they also ensure that medical forces are utilized properly and do not become over extended in secondary missions or tasks that compromise their ability to support the primary mission. 55 For example, the Army may provide medical services to a host nation that complements but does not duplicate any other assistance being provided. Unfortunately, the events in Rwanda did not unfold so neatly for MSF. Under the "watch"
of MSF, the aid that was intended for the victims actually gave power to the perpetrators of the genocide being committed in the refugee camps. MSF aid workers were faced with the decision of whether to remain in the camps and continue to provide medical care or to leave in the hopes of eliminating any assistance they were providing to the perpetrators. 60 This paradox of humanitarian assistance and ethical dilemma for NGOs remains a topic of continued debate in the NGO community.
Operations in Somalia presented a different kind of challenge for the Army. AMEDD assets were initially tasked to provide comprehensive medical support to the US peace enforcement forces and emergency medical support to coalition forces. It was understood that the mission did not call for providing health care services to Somalia nationals, refugees or any civilian relief workers. But as discussed earlier, for the better part of 1993, some AMEDD personnel did in fact provide medical care to Somalis and this angered the NGOs that were present. NGOs are often "threatened" by Army medical capabilities, afraid that the Army will take over their mission or that it will establish a level of care that they cannot maintain once the Army leaves. 61 Furthermore, while the NGOs were appreciative and took full advantage of the logistical resources that the Army provided, they in turn were critical of the Army's failure to provide protection to the civilians that were distributing humanitarian aid and in late 1993, NGOs questioned the Army's cessation of all but emergency medical care to Somalis. Little, if any coordination was made between the AMEDD assets and NGOs in the area, therefore the NGOs failed to realize that as tension in the region rose and the number of U. S. casualties increased, there was growing resentment among the Army medical staff at having to treat Somali patients.
Given these circumstances and lack of communication between these parties, it is no surprise that according to Dr. John Hammock, Professor, Tufts University, "the root of NGO conflict and controversy with military intervention in humanitarian assistance can be traced back to operations in Somalia." TF44, in Afghanistan were being realized. 64 The goal of TF44 has been to educate the local people on taking care of themselves and to generate initiatives to create a local health care
system. This would seem to be in concert with humanitarian NGO pursuits; however, some anti-military sentiments remain. and would include such valuable training as language, culture, and regional specific health topics. 70 While the Army Medical Department realizes that support in OOTW often results in partial unit deployments and some degradation of its ability to provide peacetime health care to soldiers and their families, all of which has a negative affect on readiness and overall mission performance, it also recognizes the positive effect that participation in these operations has on the clinical and operational abilities of AMEDD personnel. The Office of the Army Surgeon
General has been tasked to produce an AMEDD International Strategic Plan that will be a valuable document addressing these and similar issues, specifically the civil-military coordination that must occur in order to maximize our efforts in achieving national strategic objectives.
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CONCLUSION
The topic of civil-military relations will continue to be debated until all agencies engaged in 
